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Some firms and industries have created a product or service, built up public
awareness and acceptance for it, and, using generative, adaptive, and innovative forces
from within, have established a role and importance for their own enterprise. The
result is a de novo industrial-commercial business or complex.
Banking is not such an enterprise or industry. It has had a pattern of traditional
services, an imposed molecular structure, and a pedestrian operating technology,
none of which it could call its own. It has not innovated its service products nor
shown much adaptive ingenuity in their promotion. Its favorite image has been a
passive conformity to the mores of its better customers. Its competitive aggressiveness
has been schizophrenic, with large sectors of the industry advocating or supporting
publicly administered price ceilings for time deposits, public prohibitions against the
absorption of exchange, and a variety of regulatory devices or postures that by sanction
or promise dilute competitive ingenuity.
In some measure this unflattering characterization of banking simply reflects the
extraordinary economic vicissitudes experienced by banking institutions in the i93os
and in World War II and its aftermath. The Great Depression conditioned bank
managements and bank regulators for a long time to a deadening apprehension of
future commitments and a dedication to liquidity. World War II inflation and
vigorous growth in demand deposits produced banking euphoria by flooding the
system with loanable resources and restricting the use of these resources to the
alternatives of a wartime economy. Even in the early postwar years, the major
challenge of banking management still revolved around managing a portfolio of
government securities. These features of the early postwar banking system are evident from the balance sheets of the time.
As late as the end of 1947, seventy-three per cent of commercial banking's deposit
resources was in the form of demand deposits-sixty-five per cent being deposits of
individuals, partnerships, and corporations and eight per cent deposits of the federal
government, states, and municipal subdivisions. In the $13o billion aggregate of
deposits, time and savings accounts amounted to only $35 billion, and passbook
savings accounted for over ninety per cent of that figure. In those days the banking
system was getting its resources almost effortlessly.
Portfolio and loan totals of the time also reveal the lack of aggressiveness in bank
managements. Treasury securities made up sixty per cent of the total of loans and
investments, and tax exempts and other securities added another eight per cent. Total
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loans amounted to only $38 billion out of the $114 billion of loans and investments.
And commercial and industrial loans were nearly fifty per cent of the loan total.
I
SOME EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

The banking system has been changing significantly since those early postwar
years, but most of the forces making for change have been exogenous; change has been
induced by the performance and innovation of nonbank competitors, by the penetration of consumer credit markets by vendors, by the proliferation of financing alternatives for borrowers-both as to instruments and institutions-and indirectly by changes
in the U.S. nonfinancial economy and the goals that have been set for it.
Recently, and for the future, two developments have been having important
and potentially revolutionary effects on banking. One of these-electronic data
processing-is purely technological, while the other-a change in money use-is
institutional as well as technological. The effects of both of these developments will
be transmitted mainly by altering the manner in which banks obtain resources to
loan or invest. The changes being wrought will test the innovative and adaptive
powers of the banking system to an extent not yet fully recognized.
A. Money Use
The change in money use is an evolving trend toward more rapid turnover and
a corresponding retardation of growth in demand deposits. Between 1949 and 1955,
turnover outside of New York City rose about half as rapidly as the Gross National
Product, but in the period 1955-x966 it rose at approximately the same rate. Turnover in New York City, which is at very much higher levels, rose in step with GNP
in the earlier period and at double the rate of GNP increase in the second period.
In line with these turnover trends, demand deposits grew one-half as rapidly as GNP
in the earlier period and only one-third as rapidly from x955 through 1966. These
postwar trends in demand deposits and turnover are important for banking because
over eighty per cent of the nation's money is in the form of demand deposits, and
demand deposits make up about fifty per cent of the deposit resources of U.S. commercial banks. As this source of funds continues to decline in relative importance,
banks will suffer a corresponding decline in investable resources unless they adopt
policies to expand time deposits or borrowing or can reverse the trend toward
economization of demand deposits by attaching to them useful secondary characteristics that they do not now have.
B. Automation
The advent of automation in banking and check transactions is now apparent to
everyone. Nearly ninety per cent of the checks being written today are sorted and
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accounted for electronically. The Federal Reserve System has announced that after
September i, x967, it will not accept checks or drafts for regular processing unless
they are machinable, that is, unless they can be handled by high-speed electronic
equipment. Utilizing proven technology, we are moving rapidly toward an entirely
different system of money settlement which will make federal funds transfers
available for all nonlocal transactions of any significant size.
As these and related developments appear on the horizon, a good many bankers
and students of banking are trying to evaluate the impact of electronics and automation on the services and structure of banking. For example, will the economies and
convenience of electronic accounting for money settlement be confined to large
banks? When tied into bank customers' payroll, billing, and receivables bookkeeping
and analysis, will the service package be of such size and dimension that banking will
take on a major new function, that of the community's accounts keeper? If banks
decide thus to make their institutions local binary factories, will they find such operations so profitable and expansible that their first concern will be that of a bookkeeping service bureau and that banking will become their secondary concern?
And does this powerful new service potential offer a route for escaping regulatory confinement on corporate growth? Even now, account-keeping packages are becoming
an important feature of the services provided by some banks, and the practice is
spreading as rapidly as the needed electronic hardware and software become available.
What are the implications of automation for smaller banks? It seems possible
that, with recourse to service bureaus, cooperatives, or correspondent facilities, they
will not necessarily be seriously handicapped in competing with institutions that
operate on a scale which permits on-premises electronic equipment and processing.
There are some psychological, or perhaps fancied, advantages to keeping banking
operations "under one roof"-one corporate roof, that is. Control of quality, performance, and confidentiality are often mentioned. These arguments, however, seem
a bit artificial, for all sorts of economic services are already being contracted by business to outside experts with an actual gain in quality and performance. A loss in
confidentiality appears chimerical too-after all, the computer offers a numbered
account to everyone, and while all of the attributes of a Swiss-type numbered account
are not legally available, electronic bookkeeping is a large step toward anonymity
from what we now have.
Regardless of the size of bank, automation is bringing retail banking-the
servicing of medium- and small-sized accounts and loans-into a more profitable
focus. In the future, dependence on large personal, government, or corporate customers may very well lessen, and, as it does so, bank asset and liability structures
will shift to accommodate a new mix of customers made possible by computer facilities
which can profitably process the financial needs and transactions of heretofore
marginally-sized bank customers.
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II
INTERMEDIATIoN-THE ROAD TO GROWTH

A. Nature and Significance
In the broadest sense, modern commercial banking can be described as an in-

dustry which gathers up financial resources from the whole community of money
owners: businesses, households, and governments, and relends them to an equally
broad spectrum of private and public users. Over the years the business of acting
as a go-between, or intermediary, for owners and users of money and credit has been
built up as a personal or institutional relationship. It has not depended on sophisticated products or processes or on complex machinery.
Attracting demand deposits has been a matter of providing a variety of banking

services at convenient locations and, for some customers, the assurance of access to
bank credit. Attracting time deposits, the other major source of lending capacity,
has involved providing much the same convenience facilities and a somewhat more
limited range of services, but these deposits are primarily obtained by the payment
of competitive interest rates. The advantages that banks, as well as other intermediaries, offer a large number of investors is a combination of yield, liquidity, and
convenience which market instruments, their major competitors, seldom can match.
Indeed, several kinds of depositary-type financial institutions-commercial banks,
savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and credit unions-have become
extraordinarily facile at the technique of intermediation, the art of borrowing short
and lending long.
Though it looks like alchemy and depends to a degree on financial intuition for its
profitable use, the transformation of funds serving real liquidity needs for depositors
into long-term loan commitments for borrowers is not only practicable but is also a
sound operation. Both experience and statistical analysis show that exposure to the
liquidity demands of small and medium-sized depositors is, under most circumstances, modest in proportion and predictable in timing and, therefore, manageable. The stability of these pools of funds in the aggregate is dependable, though to
a lesser degree than the stability of demand deposits at commercial banks; commercial banking learned long ago that ordinarily money claims (withdrawals) against
demand deposits simply roll around the community from one account to another and
that if a bank could attract a balanced panel of depositors from various economic and
geographic sectors in its service area it could count on surprising stability in the
aggregate of its demand deposits.
As the U.S. financial economy grew in stability and strength after the banking
reforms of the i93os, experience with somewhat less liquid claims-time deposits
and share accounts--encouraged intermediaries to work greater and greater transformations of liquidity promises and attractive yields into long-term loans against
which they extended commitments. Without a doubt this process has made saving
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easier and more profitable, and it has accommodated the interest and convenience of
much broader groups of savers and investors. It has had an equally beneficent effect
on users of loan funds, who have had the benefit of a more competitive environment
and in many cases access to credit resources not heretofore available. Increasingly,
intermediation became the best of all possible worlds for everyone-the intermediary,

the saver, and the borrower.
B. Recent Changes in Banking's "Raw Materials"
The growing significance of intermediation to the commercial banking system
is revealed in Table I, which compares capital accounts and liabilities (excluding interbank) of all insured commercial banks as of the end of 1956 and 1966. In 1956, de-

mand deposits comprised 66.2 per cent of the total compared to 45.4 per cent at the
end of x966. Time and savings deposits comprised only 24.5 per cent of the 1956
total, but had grown to 41.6 per cent by the close of 1966. Most of the growth in
TABLE I
CAPITAL ACCOUNTS AND LIABILITIES

(NOT INCLUDING

INTERBANK)

OF ALL INSURED COMMERCIAL BANKS IN THE UNITED STATES

December 1956
Capital Accounts
Borrowings
Federal funds
Other liabilities for borrowed money
Total
Demand Deposits
Mutual savings banks and savings & loan
Other IPC
U. S. Government
States and political subdivisions
Foreign
Certified & officers checks
Total
Time and Savings Deposits
Savings deposits
IPC time deposits
States and political subdivisions
Foreign
Special accounts
Total
Acceptances outstanding
Other liabilities
Total of Capital Accounts and Liabilities

.ource: Federal Reserve Call Reports.

December 1966

S Mil.
16,301

%
7.6

S Mil.
31,609

%
8.2

74

0.0

2,824
1,893

0.7
0.5

74

0.0

4,717

1.2

111,048
14,339
10,449
1,794
3,785

52.0
6.7
4.9
0.8
1.8

3,075
141,620
4,975
14,951
2,653
6,956

0.8
36.9
1.3
3.9
0.7
1.8

141,415

66.2

174,230

45.4

48,193

22.6

2,384
1,254
235

1.1
0.7
0.1

89,706
49,986
13,414
4,470
2,226

23.3
13.0
3.5
1.2
0.6

52,066

24.5

159,802

41.6

755
2,813

0.4
1.3

2,233
11,412

213,424 100.0

0.6
3.0

384,003 100.0
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the time and savings category occurred in time deposits of individuals, partnerships,
and corporations ("IPC").
The extent to which the sources of banking's "raw materials"--deposits, borrowings, and capital-are changing is undoubtedly significant for future developments.
Projecting historical trends by reference to existing deposit and debt instruments,
however, will not take into account the financial innovations on which banks may
become increasingly dependent.
For example, the Federal Reserve System conducted a survey of the ownership of
time and savings deposits held by Federal Reserve member banks in June 1957, and
again in May 1966. The survey was repeated on January 31 of this year. These data
are shown in Table 2 and show the structural changes within the IPC time and
savings category. In the 1957 survey there were four categories of time accounts
tabulated: the largest-regular savings accounts-was eighty-seven per cent of the
total. In the 1967 survey nine categories were tabulated, and, while regular savings
accounts was still the largest category, it had shrunk to sixty per cent of the total.
Accelerated growth in time deposits began early in 1957 as a result of increases in
deposit interest rates announced by banks late in I96. These were in response to an
upward revision in the maximum limits on rates which banks were permitted, by
TABLE 2
TYPES oF TIME AND SAVINGS DEPOSITS OF INDIVIDUALS, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIoNs
HELD BY MEMBER BANKS ON JUNE 6, 1957, MAY II, 1966, AND JANUARY 31, 1967

Saving Deposits

May 11, 1966'

$ Mil.
35,737

72,871

%
65.7

70,701

60.5

856
12,363
3,197
1,244

0.8
11.1
2.9
1.1

1,409
17,435
4,381
1,856

1.2
14.9
3.7
1.6

17,660

15.9

25,081

21.4

13,815
1,968
975

12.4
1.8
0.9

13,018
2,814
1,826

11.1
2.4
1.6

16,758

15.1

17,658

15.1

3,655

3.3

3,450

110,944 100.0

116,890

%

87.4

Consumer-type Time Deposits
(less than $100,000)
Savings bonds
Nonnegotiable C/Ds
Negotiable C/Ds
Open account time deposits
Total
Business-type Time Deposits
($100,000 or more)
Negotiable C/Ds
Nonnegotiable C/Ds
Open account time deposits
Total
Total C/Ds
Total open time deposits
Christmas saving & other special
accounts
Total
144 FED. RESERVE

1,961
2,254
931

BuLu 424 (1958).

S Mil.

S Mil.

%

4.8
5.5
2.3

40,883 100.0

253 FED. RESERVE
Buu. 518 (1967).

Jan. 31, 19672

June 6, 1957'

2.9
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government regulation, to pay on such deposits, effective January 1957. By June of
that year, total time and savings deposits of Federal Reserve member banks had
increased to $44.7 billion from the $41.2 billion in June 1956. (Demand deposits had
increased only $o.4 billion during the same year.) Of the $44.7 billion total time and
savings deposits in June 1957, only $i.9 billion, or 4.4 per cent, were in certificates of
deposit, and most of these ($1.3 billion) were held in country banks. Certificates of
deposit had traditionally been used by country banks in the Midwest, and were more
important in Federal Reserve districts such as St. Louis and Minneapolis than in the
banking centers of New York and Chicago. There is no breakdown of these certificates according to denomination, but it is safe to assume that almost all of these
C/Ds were under Siooooo, and were for all practical purposes nonnegotiable. The
remaining $o.6 billion held by the reserve city banks were divided as to type (the survey
at that time gave no exact breakdown), and it can be seen that the large negotiable
C/D had not yet made an important appearance as a money market instrument.
Table "z also shows that by May 11, 1966, nonnegotiable C/Ds of under $iooooo
had grown to over $2 billion. These are in the category that are regarded as
"consumer-type" time deposits. The "business-type" time deposits ($iooooo
or more
and negotiable) had grown to over $13 billion. The importance of this instrument is
underestimated in the table because only the IPC component is shown. An additional
$5 billion of such instruments is held by state governments, foreign holders, and
others. The table shows that consumer-type C/Ds have continued to increase to an
important extent since May 1966.
TABLE 3
SHARE OF FuNDs SUPPLIED

(In per cent)

1947-51 ......................
1952-56 ......................
1957-61 ......................

1962-65 ......................

Commercial
Banks

Nonbank
Financial
Institutions

Nonfinancial
Public

18.9
23.1
24.7

41.8
49.8
47.6

26.7
20.4
16.5

35.1

42.8

10.6

Note: The components do not add up to 100 per cent because the government and foreign sectors are not included.

Throughout the postwar period, banking's role as a supplier of funds to the
economy has grown steadily, as Table 3 discloses. In the first five postwar years
banks supplied less than twenty per cent of total funds raised; but by 1962-x965 the
share had risen to about thirty-five per cent. Most of this gain was paralleled by a
decline in the proportion of funds raised through the sale of market securities
directly to the nonfinancial public, but the market share of nonbank financial
intermediaries also declined somewhat from a peak of about fifty per cent reached
in the years 1952-1956. Market shares for the year 1966 were temporarily distorted
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by monetary restraint which impaired the capacity of both bank and nonbank intermediaries to attract funds in competition with security markets.
C. Intermediation in International Financial Markets
In recent years U.S. commercial banks have extended their intermediation to international financial markets, again primarily because of exogenous factors. First, the
evolution of the U.S. dollar as a vehicle currency in international transactions and as
a reserve asset enhanced the importance of New York as an international financial
center and led to the development of the so-called "Eurodollar" market in Europe.
A recent estimate by the Bank for International Settlements puts the volume of this
market at about $13 billion.
Second, the formation of the European Economic Community, with its greatly
expanded market and its vigorous rate of economic growth, provided incentives for
U.S. business to expand in this area, and for U.S. banks to increase their activity in
order to meet these new requirements of their regular customers. But U.S. banks
have been expanding elsewhere also.
One way of measuring the increasing importance of the international money
market as a source of funds to banks is to look at the rates of growth in their
short-term liabilities to foreigners. In the five years between the end of 1957 and the
end of 1962, short-term liabilities to foreign banks (including foreign branches of U.S.
banks) and other foreigners expanded at an annual average rate of about $45o
million. Between 1962 and the end of 1966, the average annual increment was
about $1.4 billion, even without counting negotiable certificates of deposit. While
we do not have separate figures for them, we assume that negotiable C/Ds held
by foreigners also increased significantly in the latter period.
In part, this growth in banks' short-term liabilities to foreigners is the counterpart of increasing bank claims on foreigners, which went up by an average of
about $1.2 billion a year in the period i96o-1963 and by a record $2.5 billion in 1964
following the imposition of the interest equalization tax on foreign security issues.
It was this last development, by the way, which did much to lead to the extension of
the interest equalization tax to long-term bank loans and the announcement of the
voluntary foreign credit restraint program in February 1965. But to a great extent the
increase in deposit liabilities reflects the ability of American banks to tap this source
of funds.
Operations of foreign branches of U.S. banks have been very important in acquiring these funds. The number of these branches has increased from 117 at the
end of 1955 to 244 at the end of 1966; during the same period total assets of the
branches have increased by over six times-from $2 billion to $12.4 billion. A large
part of this increase has been in the dollar, or "international," business of the branches
as distinguished from transactions in other currencies, their "domestic" business.
A dramatic example of the ability of the branches to acquire funds occurred
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during the scramble for liquidity in the latter part of 1966. During this period the
branches passed on to their head offices for use in the U.S. market about $2.5
billion in funds acquired from foreign holders of dollar balances, including other
foreign banks. It is quite clear that from now on the international market will have
to be regarded as an important source of funds which American banks may tap when
they find it attractive.
III
BANKING STRUCTURE:

Do

COMPETITivE RESTRAINTS IMPEDE

BANK RESPONSE TO MARKET OPPORTUNITIES?

A. Constraints of Regulation
The structure of banking in the United States is generally thought to reflect in a
rather large way the constraints of state laws with respect to banking operations.
These restrictions impair the freedom of banks to move from their original location,
to branch, to merge, or to exploit opportunities outside of their immediate demand
deposit service areas. The presumption of statutory containment, however, is often
carried too far. It fails to hold up as a complete explanation for the banking system's
slowness to develop and respond to market opportunities.
Banks are multiproduct or multiservice firms, and there are many markets in
which they are able to participate without significant statutory constrictions. A good
example is in their asset acquisitions, where they can compete freely on a nationwide
basis with the other banks, other financial institutions, nonfinancial businesses, and
individuals for Government securities, corporate securities, state and local securities,
mortgages and consumer paper (to some degree), and for business loans of the
larger and more important corporations. In these markets, Pacific Coast banks
compete with New York, Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, or Dallas institutions.
The ability of banks to make loans and investments and, to a lesser degree, to attract
deposits from far beyond their home office locations has served to relax significantly
the performance constraints of state laws restricting bank location. But despite the
fact that banking in the United States as a whole has been able to respond reasonably
well to many needs of our over-all economic system and to business practices and
consumer habits, there is no gainsaying that in some economic and geographic sectors
the efficiency and services of banking have been circumscribed by regulatory policies
and the confinement of state laws and conforming federal practices.
B. Structural Constraints
I. DescribingBanking Structure
The term "banking structure" is used frequently and easily without specification as
to its precise meaning, but generally the reference is to number, size, and location
of banks. Thus, there were, at the end of 1966, 13,770 commercial banks operating out
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Of 30,000 offices with $330 billion in deposits (excluding deposits of other commercial
banks). On the average, there was an office for every 6,700 persons, but in actual fact
a large number of the 30,000 offices were in relatively small communities, and in
these locations they ordinarily served populations of less than 1,5oo. In the nation,
outside of metropolitan areas, there were 7,600 one-office towns, and nearly all of these
were the sole office of an independent bank. There were i,6oo communities with two
offices and goo with three or more. All of the other banking offices were in metropolitan areas.
While such demographic data are useful in understanding the functioning of
our banking system, the concept of "banking structure" should be expanded to
consider the degree and nature of a bank's participation in various asset or deposit
markets. Banks of similar size and location do not necessarily evidence similar
operating policies or have similar operating opportunities-but the structure of their
assets and liabilities ordinarily reveals the determining influence of various environmental conditions.
Moreover, when we refer to a bank in the United States it may be to an
institution with a few million dollars of deposits oriented to the needs and outlook
of sparsely populated farming areas, or it may be a multioffice and multibillion
dollar institution serving the population of an entire metropolitan area or state, and
experiencing rapid economic growth.
The large banks are growth- as well as profit-minded. They cultivate customers
on a nationwide, if not a worldwide, scale, even though their local base of operations
may be eroded by confining legislation and economic stagnation. On the other hand,
the small community banks are locally oriented and resigned to accepting the community's economic growth and development as a limiting factor in their growth goal.
The problem of characterizing banking structure by size, location, and concentration involves criteria for size and a method of determining significant market
areas. Bank size can be defined, for example, in terms of total resources, or total
deposits, or demand deposits, or demand deposits of individuals, partnerships,
and corporations, or demand deposits IPC under $xoo,ooo, or demand deposits IPC
under $25,000 or $ioooo. These are alternative measures; some are better than others,
given a particular purpose. Total deposits is probably the best measure of size
despite its shortcomings as an indication of local activity-a shortcoming that arises
from the fact that it includes both local and nonlocal deposits, for, as is well known,
many banks have deposits from firms and individuals far removed from their home
office, sometimes as far removed as a distant state or nation.
For a measure of size in a local market, helpful proxies are available in the number of demand deposit accounts or the amount of demand deposits in accounts with
balances of less than $iooooo or even $25,ooo. The logic of the proxies using size-ofaccount data is that, while there is no sure way of knowing how many deposit accounts
over Siooooo are nonlocal, it is fairly sure that many of them are of this character.

EXOGENOUS FORCES

IN BANKING

And as to the accounts under $25,000, we can be quite sure that most of these deposits

are of a strictly local character-owned by local individuals, businesses, or corporations. This fact makes the size group of under $25,000 a reasonable proxy for bank
participation in the local deposit and credit markets.
2.

Measuring Banking Concentration

A major source of interest in banking structure arises from its impact on banking
competition. The geographical areas that encompass important banking markets may
be local, regional, or national. The local markets are usually a metropolitan area,
a city, a county or town, or even a neighborhood. The regional markets can be
approximated by regarding a state or group of states as a significant area. The
advantage of regarding a state as a market area is that more pertinent economic and
demographic data are available for states. Moreover, aggregate state data can be
viewed as an average structure, reflecting both the over-all economic environment of
the state and the statutory freedom or constraint imposed by the state's banking
laws.
For any given geographical area and size criterion, there are data and a technique
for summarizing structural characteristics. From periodic (approximately quarterly)
call reports for all insured banks in the United States, a uniform balance sheet and
supplemental exhibits detail a variety of asset and liability items by bank. These
data can be tabulated for any classification or array of banks by any asset or liability
category on the call.

For example, using the entire United States as the geographical area and total
deposits as a measure of size, we derive the following table on banking concentration
(as of December 1965):

{

J.%

13~

%in

5%
%

o5

bkL

65

25%

number,

1,9 69 J

Looking at the other end of the spectrum:

{est
25%1

The sma

% of the banks,

85%

3,283 1

1.6Y

,5847 innumber, have

L ,6oJ

total deposits.

71

L 8z%

17.5%

}

of total

deposits.

These concentration characteristics for the nation are also rather surprisingly typical
for a large number of individual states with a variety of banking structures. For example, states where as much as fifty per cent of the deposits are held in one per cent of
the banks are as diversified in banking structure as California (statewide branching),
Georgia (limited branching and holding company), Illinois (unit only), Minnesota
(unit and holding company), and New York (limited branching and holding company). In these states and in several other groups of states, dissimilar banking laws
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have led to some obvious differences in structure, but the concentration figures are
very much alike. On the other hand, there are instances, particularly in the South
and Southeast, where branching restrictions, or their absence, seem to have had a
marked effect on concentration. The Carolinas and Virginia, for example, show the
effects on concentration of branching freedom, just as Arkansas, Mississippi, and
West Virginia show the results of branching restraints.
Without doubt the variegation in state banking structures is greater because of
the differences in regulatory constraints, but state-to-state differences in economic
environment are often an overriding factor tending to accentuate or moderate those
constraints. And the response of bankers themselves to the combination of the
economic and regulatory environment is still another significant factor affecting the
banking structures actually existing.
CONCLUSION

Whatever phase of commercial banking one examines, the imprints of environment, precedent, and authority are evident. In the beginning "bankers' money"demand deposits or notes-was an adaptation of the "sovereign's money"--coin and
currency-with the identical problem of confidence and a similar opportunity for
gain. In our time, the development of new lending techniques and instruments,
the introduction of credit to new users and uses, and the competitive tapping of loanable resources are, by and large, innovations taken over by the banking system after
experimental and developmental costs have been charged off by someone else. Banking has not done badly, profitwise, in its imitative, cautious role, but it may not-up to
now-aspire to the reputation of a growth industry. However, the impact of automation and changing money use on banking is potentially capable of transforming the
industry into an innovator for the first time in its existence.

